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DISSENTING OPINION of Judge Jeton Bytyqi, who was joined by Judge Enver Peci in case no. KI121/22

Case No. KI121/22

Applicant: Mexhid Asllani, Ekrem Asllani and Nuredin Xhaferi

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Prishtina, on​​ 16​​ May​​ 2024

Ref. no.:​​ MM​​ 2429/24

 

 

 

This translation is unofficial and serves for informational purposes only.

 

 

 

DISSENTING OPINION

of Judge​​ Jeton Bytyqi,​​ who was joined by Judge Enver Peci

 

in

 

case​​ no. KI121/22

 

Applicants

 

Mexhid Asllani, Ekrem Asllani​​ and​​ Nuredin​​ Xhaferi

 

 

Constitutional review of Decision​​ [Rev. no. 434/2021]​​ of​​ 24​​ May​​ 2022​​ of the​​ Supreme​​ Court and Judgment​​ [Ac. no. 1148/2018]​​ of​​ 4​​ March​​ 2020​​ of the Court of Appeals

 

 

We respect the decision of the Majority of Judges (hereinafter: the Majority) of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo (hereinafter: the Court). However, always with respect, we have voted against the admissibility of the​​ referral​​ and finding a violation of paragraph 1 of​​ Article 31 [Right to Fair and Impartial Trial] of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (hereinafter: the Constitution), in​​ conjunction​​ with paragraph 1 of Article 6 (Right to a​​ fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR). Therefore, for the reasons that will be elaborated below and based on​​ Rule 56 (Dissenting Opinions) of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo (hereinafter:​​ the​​ Rules of Procedure) we present this Dissenting Opinion.​​ 

 

 

Scope of the​​ Referral

 

  • The applicants​​ challenge​​ the constitutionality of (i) Decision [Rev. no. 434/2021] of 24​​ May​​ 2022 of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kosovo (hereinafter:​​ the​​ Supreme Court) and the constitutionality of (ii) Judgment [Ac. no. 1148/2018] of 4​​ March​​ 2020 of the Court of Appeals, in​​ conjunction​​ with Judgment [C. no. 395/2015] of 23​​ June​​ 2017 of the Basic Court in Ferizaj (hereinafter:​​ the​​ Basic Court).

 

  • The applicants consider that the aforementioned decisions violated their rights guaranteed by articles 31 [Right to Fair and Impartial Trial], 32 [Right to Legal​​ Remedies] and 54 [Judicial Protection of Rights] of the Constitution of the Republic of​​ Kosovo (hereinafter: the Constitution), as well as Article 6.1 (Right to a​​ fair trial) of the ECHR.​​ 

 

  • The majority decided (i) to declare the​​ referral​​ admissible; (ii)​​ to​​ find that there has been a violation of paragraph 1 of​​ Article 31 [Right to Fair and Impartial Trial] of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, in​​ conjunction with​​ paragraph 1 of​​ Article 6 (Right to a​​ fair trial) of the ECHR; (iii) declare​​ invalid the​​ Decision [Rev. no. 434/2021] of 24​​ May​​ 2022, Judgment [Rev. no. 426/2020] of 29​​ June​​ 2021 of the Supreme Court and Judgment [Ac. no. 1148/2018] of 4​​ March​​ 2020 of the Court of Appeals; and (iv)​​ to remand​​ the Judgment [Ac. no. 1148/2018] of 4​​ March​​ 2020 of the Court of Appeals,​​ for​​ retrial​​ to​​ the latter.

 

Facts of the case and Applicant’s allegations​​ 

 

  • The facts of the case, as reflected in the Judgment in case KI121/22, are related to a traffic accident in which the applicants suffered bodily injuries, the cause of which was the insured of the respondent Sigal Uniqua Group Austria. The applicants filed a lawsuit against the company in question​​ with​​ the Basic Court,​​ by​​ which they requested compensation for material​​ and non-material damage​​ on the grounds of​​ physical and mental injuries suffered​​ in​​ the accident.​​ 

 

  • The Basic Court​​ by​​ the Judgment [C.​​ no.​​ 395/2015] partially approved the​​ lawsuit​​ of the applicants and​​ obliged​​ the​​ respondent​​ Sigal Uniqua Group Austria to pay them the total amount of eight thousand seven hundred and fifty one euro (8,751.00) euro, while​​ it​​ rejected the claim for the amount of seven thousand eight hundred and forty (7,840.00) euro, which divided for each applicant did not exceed the amount of three thousand (3,000.00) euro. Against the Judgment of the Basic Court (i)​​ the respondent​​ Sigal Uniqua Group Austria; and (ii) the applicants submitted appeals to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals,​​ by​​ the Judgment [Ac.​​ no.​​ 1148/2018], of 4​​ March​​ 2020, rejected the appeal of the respondent Sigal Uniqua Group Austria,​​ upholding​​ the Judgment of the Basic Court. The Court of Appeals,​​ by​​ the aforementioned Judgment,​​ did​​ not decide in relation to the​​ appeal​​ of the applicants.

 

  • Against the Judgment [Ac. no. 1148/2018], of 4​​ March​​ 2020, of the Court of Appeals​​ (i)​​ the respondent​​ Sigal Uniqua Group Austria; and (ii) the applicants submitted a revision to the Supreme Court. As a result of this, the Supreme Court, (i)​​ by​​ the Judgment [Rev. no. 426/2020] of 29​​ June​​ 2021, rejected the revision of the respondent Sigal Uniqua Group. Whereas, (ii)​​ upon​​ the​​ request​​ of the applicants​​ to consider their revision, the Supreme Court,​​ by​​ Decision [Rev. no. 434/2021],​​ supplemented​​ the Judgment [Rev. 426/2020] of the Supreme Court and decided to dismiss as impermissible the revision of the applicants, based on paragraph 2 of Article 211 and Article 221 of Law No. 03/L-006​​ on Contested​​ Procedure (hereinafter:​​ the​​ LCP), on the grounds that the value of the dispute, of each applicant, did not exceed the amount of three thousand (3,000.00) euro.

 

  • Before the Court, the applicants​​ allege​​ a violation of (i) the right to fair and impartial trial guaranteed by Article 31 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the ECHR; (ii) the right to legal remedies guaranteed by Article 32 of the Constitution; as well as (iii) the right to judicial protection of rights, guaranteed by Article 54 of the Constitution, among others, since according to them (i) the Court of Appeals​​ did not consider their appeal against the Judgment of the Basic Court; while (ii) the Supreme Court has not examined the merits of their revision against the Judgment [Ac. no. 1148/2018], of 4​​ March​​ 2020,​​ of the Court of Appeals, where, among other things, the issue of not considering the appeal of the applicants by the Court of Appeals​​ was raised.​​ 

 

Preliminary remarks

 

  • As it was emphasized above, the Majority found that the​​ contested​​ decisions are​​ rendered​​ in violation of paragraph 1 of​​ Article 31 [Right to Fair and Impartial Trial] of the Constitution, in​​ conjunction with​​ paragraph 1 of​​ Article 6 (Right to a fair trial) of the ECHR, on the grounds that the Supreme Court has violated the principle of​​ access to the court​​ because it did not assess​​ the​​ allegation​​ of the applicants that the Court of Appeals​​ has not decided on the appeal filed against the Judgment of the Basic Court, but rejected the revision as impermissible because the value determined in the​​ contested​​ judgment​​ of​​ the Court of Appeals​​ by​​ the revision​​ for​​ each applicant​​ has not exceeded the amount of three thousand (3,000.00) euro, as a​​ requirement​​ to​​ file​​ the revision based on​​ Article 211 of the LCP.​​ 

 

  • In this regard, for the Majority it has not been​​ disputable​​ that (ii) the​​ contested​​ monetary amount by each of the applicants​​ against​​ the Judgment of the Court of Appeals​​ is below the amount of three thousand (3,000.00) euro; nor (ii) the way of calculating the​​ contested​​ value​​ as a consequence​​ of simple co-litigation, where the procedural position of a co-litigator does not depend on the procedural position of the other co-litigants, but is taken separately for each one of them.​​ According to​​ the Majority it was disputable, whether, despite the fact that the amounts​​ contested​​ through the revision by each of the applicants is below the amount of three thousand (3,000.00) euro, the Supreme Court, by rejecting as impermissible the revision of the applicants against the Judgment of the Court of Appeals​​ violated the right of applicants​​ of​​ access to court​​ as an integral part of a fair trial guaranteed by Article 31 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the ECHR. The​​ Majority reasoned that regardless of the criterion of admissibility of the value​​ contested by​​ revision, the Supreme Court had the obligation to deal with the revision of the​​ applicants, taking into account that the​​ applicants​​ raised​​ before it the issue of not handling their​​ appeal​​ against the​​ Judgment​​ of the​​ Basic​​ Court by the Court of Appeals.​​ 

 

  • With respect to the​​ Majority, we cannot agree with the above-mentioned findings, as we consider that these findings are not compatible with the​​ case law​​ of the Court and that of the ECtHR.

 

 

Regarding the constitutionality of Judgment [Rev. no. 426/2020] and Decision [Rev. no. 434/2021] of the Supreme Court

 

  • Initially, as it has been emphasized​​ also​​ in the Courts​​ case law, the issue of rejecting the revision because it does not reach the value​​ established​​ by law falls within the scope of the right to​​ access to court, as an integral part of a​​ fair​​ trial right guaranteed by Article 31 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the ECHR (see the case of the Court,​​ KI96/22,​​ applicants​​ Naser​​ Husaj​​ and​​ Uliks Husaj,​​ Resolution on​​ Inadmissibility,​​ of​​ 29​​ August​​ 2023, paragraph​​ 49).​​ Therefore, based on the case law of the ECtHR, but also of the​​ Court, the​​ rights​​ to​​ court” determines that the parties to the proceedings must have an effective legal remedy that enables them to protect their civil rights (see the above-mentioned cases of the Court​​ KI54/21,​​ applicant​​ Kamber Hoxha,​​ paragraph​​ 62;​​ KI224/19,​​ with aforementioned Applicant​​ Islam Krasniqi,​​ paragraph​​ 35;​​ and​​ KI20/21,​​ with aforementioned Applicant​​ Violeta​​ Todorović, paragraph​​ 41,​​ see in this regard also the aforementioned cases​​ of the ECtHR,​​ Běleš​​ and others v. Czech ​​ Republic, paragraph​​ 49,​​ also the aforementioned case​​ Naït-Liman​​ v. Switzerland, paragraph​​ 112).

 

  • However,​​ the right to​​ access to court​​ s not absolute, but it can be subject to limitations, since by its very nature it calls for regulation by the state, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard​​ (see in this regard the aforementioned case of the Court KI54/21, paragraph 64; KI20/21, cited above, paragraph​​ 44).​​ In this context, any limitation of the right of access to the court must not limit or reduce a persons access in such a way or to such an extent as to impair the very essence of​​ the right to a court”.​​ Such limitations will not be compatible if they do not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved​​ (see case of the Court​​ KI20/21,​​ cited above, paragraph 58, and the ECtHR cases:​​ Sotiris​​ and​​ Nikos​​ Koutras ATTEE​​ v. Greece,​​ Judgment of​​ 16​​ November​​ 2000,​​ paragraph​​ 15,​​ and​​ Běleš​​ and Others v. the Czech Republic, Judgment of 12 November 2002, paragraph​​ 61).

 

  • In this context, and more specifically related to the​​ legal​​ ratione valoris​​ threshold, the ECtHR through its​​ case law​​ has emphasized that the latter​​ recognised that the application of a statutory ratione valoris threshold for appeals to the supreme court is a legitimate and reasonable procedural requirement having regard to the very essence of the supreme court’s role to deal only with matters of the requisite significance​​ (see ECtHR​​ Zubac​​ v. Croatia​​ no.​​ 40160/12,​​ Judgment of​​ 5​​ April​​ 2018,​​ paragraph​​ 83,​​ and cases cited therein).​​ 

 

  • The ECtHR also clarified that​​ “with respect to the application of statutory ratione valoris restrictions on access to the superior courts, the Court has to varying degrees taken account of certain further factors, namely (i) the foreseeability of the restriction, (ii) whether it is the applicant or the respondent State who should bear the adverse consequences of the errors made during the proceedings that led to the applicant’s being denied access to the supreme court and (iii) whether the restrictions in question could be said to involve „excessive formalism​​ (see,​​ case​​ Zubac​​ v.​​ Croatia, paragraph​​ 85,​​ and cases cited therein).​​ 

 

  • Therefore, as it results from the principles of the ECtHR, in principle, conditioning a legal remedy at the level of the Supreme Court with a certain value, from the point of view of the right to a fair trial, is allowed and legitimate, taking into account the essence of the role of the higher courts to deal only with matters of necessary importance, and must meet the aforementioned criteria defined in the case law of the ECtHR.

 

  • In the present case, the Supreme Court,​​ by​​ the contested decision, decided that the revision of the​​ applicants​​ is not allowed on the grounds that the value of the dispute, of each​​ applicant​​ separately, based on the simple​​ co-litigation, did not exceed the amount of three thousand (3,000.00) euro.​​ The Supreme Court based its decision on paragraph 2 of article 211 and article 221 of the LCP. More specifically, Article 211 of the LCP defines the criteria for the permissibility of the revision, specifying that:​​ Revision is not permitted in the property-judicial contests, in which the charge request involves money requests, handing items or fulfillment of a proposal if the value of the object of contest in the attacked part of the decision does not exceed 3, 000 €”.

 

  • Exceptionally, paragraph 4 of article 211 of the LCP​​ establishes​​ an exhaustive list of when revision is always allowed, and that​​ related​​ to (a) food disputes; (b) disputes for the compensation of damage for lost food, due to the death of the food​​ donator; and (c) disputes from employment relationships which the employee initiates against the decision to terminate the employment relationship. Consequently, with regard to the​​ abovementioned issues, revision is always allowed, regardless of the value of the dispute, which in the present case, was not the case.​​ 

 

  • In this regard, while article 211 of the LCP​​ establishes​​ the criteria for the permissibility of the revision, article 214 of the​​ LCP​​ (amended and​​ supplemented​​ ​​ by​​ Law 04/L-118), defines the​​ grounds​​ for which the revision can be​​ filed.​​ 

 

  • Therefore, if the​​ filed​​ revision is allowed, including if the amount of the dispute is over three thousand (3,000.00) euro and when this is applicable, based on the admissibility criteria defined in article 211 of the LCP, then the​​ latter​​ is reviewed based on​​ Article 214 of the aforementioned Law, and the​​ grounds​​ stipulated​​ in this article. From this it follows that the​​ grounds​​ for the revision defined in article 214 of the LCP, can be examined only when the Supreme Court has established the permissibility of the revision as defined in​​ Article 211 of this Law. Consequently, in the present case​​ too, the Supreme Court, assessing that none of the applicants had exceeded the threshold of three thousand (3,000.00) euro, had​​ found​​ and consequently decided that the revision was not allowed as​​ established​​ in​​ Article 211 of the LCP.

 

  • Based on the above, we consider that this finding of the Supreme Court is in harmony with the already consolidated​​ case law​​ of the Constitutional Court in a number of cases before, when​​ it assessed the issue of the admissibility of the revision before the Supreme Court as a result of not meeting the threshold of the value of the dispute. In this context, we refer to the case of the Court​​ KI199/18,​​ Resolution on​​ Inadmissibility​​ of 6​​ June​​ 2019, namely paragraph 38, where the Court emphasized that​​ The case law of this Court indicates that there were other cases when a decision of the Supreme Court was challenged- such as the present one – by which were rejected as inadmissible the requests for revision, and in ​​ which the value of the dispute was below € 3,000. In such cases, the Court, as in the present case, focused only on that whether, in entirety, the respective Applicants have benefited from fair and impartial trial, not entering the issues of legality and aspects of the interpretation of procedural and substantive law, as such prerogatives are the competence of the regular courts. Therefore, the Court declared such cases inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. (See the cases of the Constitutional Court where a Supreme Court decision was challenged that the request for revision was rejected on procedural grounds as inadmissible: KI66/18​​ Applicant​​ Sahit Muçolli, Resolution of 6 December 2018;​​ KI110/16​​ Applicant​​ Nebojša Ðokić, Resolution of 24 March 2017;​​ KI24/16​​ Applicant​​ Avdi Haziri, Resolution of 4 November 2016;​​ KI112/14​​ Applicant​​ Srboljub Krstić, Resolution of 19 January 2015;​​ Applicant​​ Gani, Ahmet and Nazmije Sopaj, Resolution of 18 November​​ 2013).”

 

  • Therefore, we consider that in the present case​​ too, the Supreme Court applying paragraph 2 of article 211 of the​​ LCP, deciding​​ regarding​​ its jurisdiction defined by law, decided that the revision of the​​ applicants​​ is not allowed because the value​​ contested​​ by the​​ Judgment​​ of the​​ Court​​ of Appeals​​ for each applicant, does not exceed the value of three thousand (3,000.00) euro, for each applicant. Furthermore, it has not been argued by the applicants that this legal limitation​​ ratione valoris​​ ​​ for access to the Supreme Court, and based on the criteria defined in the case law of the ECtHR, including the case of​​ Zubac v. Croatia, cited above: (i) is not predictable; (ii) the applicants have borne the​​ adverse​​ consequences of errors during the proceedings​​ that led to the denial of the applicants access to the supreme court; and that (iii) the interpretation of the Supreme Court results in​​ excessive formalism”.

 

  • Also, it is important to emphasize that according to the​​ case law​​ of the ECtHR and that of the Court, the​​ rules governing the procedural steps to be taken and the time-limits to be complied​​ with regard to filing​​ an appeal are designed to ensure the proper administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty​​ (see case of the Court, KI210/19,​​ Resolution​​ ​​ on Inadmissibility of​​ 15​​ July​​ 2020, paragraph​​ 37;​​ and ECtHR case​​ Ben Salah Adraqui and Dhaime​​ v. Spain, no. 45023/98,​​ Decision of​​ 27​​ April​​ 2000).

 

  • Therefore, we consider that the regular courts have an obligation to respect their jurisdiction defined by the Constitution and the law. On the contrary, the issue of exceeding the jurisdiction of a court, based on the​​ case law​​ of the ECtHR and​​ of​​ the Court, raises issues of the right​​ to​​ a tribunal established by law,​​ as an integral part of a fair​​ trial. In this regard, I refer to the case of the Court which emphasized that this principle is violated, among other things, if a court has decided outside its jurisdiction (see the case of the Court​​ KI14/22,​​ Applicant​​ Shpresa Gërvalla,​​ Judgment of​​ 23​​ February 2023, paragraph 58 as well as cases​​ Coëme​​ and others v. Belgium, no.​​ 32492/96​​ and four others, Judgment of 22 June 2000, paragraphs 107-109 and​​ Sokurenko​​ and​​ Strygun​​ v.​​ Ukraine, nos. 29458/04​​ and​​ 29465/04,​​ Judgment of​​ 20​​ July​​ 2006, paragraphs​​ 26-28);

 

  • Moreover, the Court​​ by​​ its Judgment in case​​ KI214/19,​​ Applicant​​ Murteza Koka,​​ found a violation of the applicants right to fair and impartial trial, guaranteed by Article 31 of the Constitution as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court​​ by​​ which the applicant’s case,​​ decided by the Judgment of the Court of Appeals​​ which​​ upheld​​ the Judgment of the Basic Court and which had become​​ res-judicata,​​ was reopened​​ precisely considering the value of the dispute which, according to court decisions, was below the amount for which the revision is allowed, namely below the amount (3,000.00) euro, while the value of the object of the dispute with no decision of the regular courts was contested and corrected (see Court’s​​ case KI214/19, applicant​​ Murteza Koka, Judgment of 29​​ July​​ 2020).​​ 

 

  • Having said that, if the Supreme Court were to ignore the legal requirements regarding the value of the amount​​ contested​​ by revision, as defined in article 211 of the​​ LCP, it would exceed its jurisdiction​​ established​​ in this law, and this would result in a violation of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 31 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the ECHR.

 

  • Based on the above, we consider that the applicants’ referral​​ regarding (i) the Decision [Rev. no. 434/2021] of 24 May 2022 of the Supreme Court is​​ manifestly ill-founded, as​​ established​​ in paragraph 2 of​​ Rule 34 (Admissibility Criteria) of the Rules of Procedure.

 

Regarding constitutionality of Judgment​​ [Ac. no. 1148/2018]​​ of​​ 4​​ March​​ 2020,​​ of the Court of Appeals

 

  • Regarding the Judgment of the Court of Appeals, the fact is that the applicants had a legitimate claim, related to the non-handling of their​​ appeal​​ by the Court of Appeals,​​ by​​ its Judgment [Ac. no. 1148/2018] of 4​​ March​​ 2020, which raises the issue of the right to​​ access to justice​​ guaranteed by Article 31 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the ECHR.

 

  • However, we consider that the applicants had available legal​​ remedies​​ to challenge the Judgment of the Court of Appeals​​ before the Constitutional Court through the​​ individual​​ referral​​ as provided for​​ in paragraph 7 of Article 113 [Jurisdiction and Authorized Parties] of the Constitution.​​ 

 

  • This is because, first of all, as the Court's​​ case law​​ currently stands,​​ it is​​ not required, after the decision of the Court of Appeals, to​​ exhaust​​ extraordinary legal remedies, as is the case​​ by​​ the revision, in order to​​ address​​ the Constitutional Court (see the case of the Court​​ KI24/20,​​ Applicant​​ “Pamex SH.P.K”​​ Judgment of 3 February​​ 2021).​​ 

 

  • Secondly,​​ regardless​​ of​​ the above, the Court has clarified through its​​ case law​​ that in cases where the extraordinary legal remedy of revision in the Supreme Court is not allowed based on the applicable law, the​​ latter​​ cannot be used for the purposes of calculating the four (4) month​​ deadline​​ and that as​​ final decision​​ should be counted the decision of the relevant court against which the extraordinary legal remedy of revision​​ was filed, and which is​​ challenged​​ before the Court. Therefore, these circumstances, in principle, include cases where the extraordinary legal remedy of revision in the Supreme Court was used, despite the fact that it is not allowed based on articles 211 of the​​ LCP, including in the case when the value of the dispute is below the amount of three thousand ( 3,000.00) euro (see the case of the Court​​ KI118/20​​ with applicant​​ Selim Leka,​​ Resolution​​ on Inadmissibility, of 21​​ October​​ 2021, paragraphs 44-48). Consequently, in the aforementioned case, the Court had declared the​​ referral​​ as out of time.​​ 

 

  • Having said that, after​​ being served with​​ the Judgment [Ac. no. 1148/2018] of 4​​ March​​ 2020 of the Court of Appeals, nothing has prevented the applicants​​ from addressing the Constitutional Court. Despite this, they have used the legal remedy of revision against the Judgment of the Court of Appeals, aware that the value​​ contested​​ for each applicant is below the value of three thousand (3,000.00) euro, which has resulted in their revision being rejected as impermissible.

 

  • Therefore, we consider that the​​ final decision, according to Article 49 of the Law, is the Decision [Ac. no. 1148/2018] of the Court of Appeals​​ of 4​​ March​​ 2020, and which, based on the circumstances of the case, we consider to have been​​ submitted​​ before the Court outside the four (4) month deadline​​ established​​ by Article 49 (Deadlines) of the Law on the Constitutional Court and paragraph 1 (c) of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure.

 

 

Respectfully submitted​​ by:

 

 

Judge​​ Jeton Bytyqi      Judge​​ Enver Peci  

 

 

 

 

 

 

This translation is unofficial and serves for informational purposes only.

 

1

 

Applicant:

Mexhid Asllani, Ekrem Asllani and Nuredin Xhaferi

Type of Referral:

KI – Individual Referral

Type of act:

Other orders

Dissenting opinion

Type of procedure followed before other institutions :

Civil